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Outbreaks of foodborne hepatitis A are rarely recog-
nized as such. Detection of these infections is challeng-
ing because of the infection’s long incubation period and 
patients’ recall bias. Nevertheless, the complex food mar-
ket might lead to reemergence of hepatitis A virus outside 
of disease-endemic areas. To assess the role of food as 
a source of infection, we combined routine surveillance 
with real-time strain sequencing in the Netherlands during 
2008–2010. Virus RNA from serum of 248 (59%) of 421 re-
ported case-patients could be sequenced. Without typing, 
foodborne transmission was suspected for only 4% of re-
ported case-patients. With typing, foodborne transmission 
increased to being the most probable source of infection 
for 16%. We recommend routine implementation of an en-
hanced surveillance system that includes prompt forward-
ing and typing of hepatitis A virus RNA isolated from serum, 
standard use of questionnaires, data sharing, and central-
ized interpretation of data.
Hepatitis A virus (HAV) infection is an acute, usually self-limiting, illness; transmission is associated with 
suboptimal hygiene. Transmission occurs by the oral route, 
and infected persons can shed high amounts of infectious 
virus in their feces (1). Over recent decades, the incidence 
of HAV infections has been declining to a low level of trans-
mission in high-income and middle-income countries. This 
epidemiologic shift results in a gradual shift in patient age 
and severity of first infection, from asymptomatic infec-
tions in very young children toward more severe illness in 
older children and adults. The World Health Organization 
estimates a case-fatality rate ranging from 0.1% for children 
<15 years of age to 2.1% for adults >40 years of age (2). As 
incidence of HAV decreases, the proportion of the popula-
tion vulnerable to infection increases. Thus, paradoxically, 
hepatitis A virus could reemerge in regions where it is not 
endemic, affecting mostly adults. Risk for outbreaks with 
more severe illness becomes greater in countries where 
such epidemiologic transition has occurred.
In countries with low levels of HAV, the main risk comes 
from travel, secondary waves of transmission in households 
and schools, and (ongoing and sometimes epidemic) trans-
mission among men who have sex with men (MSM) (3–11). 
However, the probable source of infection remains unknown 
for 20%–30% of cases, possibly because of transmission by 
persons with subclinical or missed primary cases, but al-
ternatively because of food contamination. Although HAV 
is listed as the second most common foodborne virus (12), 
foodborne HAV infections are rarely reported, except when 
triggered by an unusual outbreak or event. In general, de-
tection of a food source is difficult because the incubation 
period for hepatitis A is long (average 4 weeks); therefore, 
responses to food-consumption questionnaires, if adminis-
tered, might be unreliable because of recall bias. Moreover, 
the food industry is a complex multinational system, and 
many high-risk products (shellfish, fresh or frozen fruits and 
vegetables) are produced in HAV-endemic countries. The 
common methods used for microbiological quality control 
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of food do not reliably predict presence or absence of virus 
contamination (13). Virus contamination of high-risk foods 
is not uncommon; some of these products have a long shelf 
life as frozen or dried products in which HAV can survive 
for at least 2–3 months (14,15), and these products can be 
marketed over a wide geographic region. For these reasons, 
foodborne HAV infections are difficult to recognize.
These surveillance challenges might discourage phy-
sicians from trying to signal foodborne outbreaks. Large 
outbreaks are detected because of their large numbers. 
Slow and dispersed clusters can be detected through use of 
molecular typing, which enables linking of cases that other-
wise could not be recognized as a cluster (16,17).
We assessed the role of food as a source of HAV in 
the Netherlands, a country with low-level endemic circu-
lation of HAV. To do so, we conducted a 2-year study in 
which we combined detailed epidemiologic investigation 
with real-time strain sequencing for reported case-patients.
Methods
Routine Surveillance
In the Netherlands, HAV infection is a reportable dis-
ease. Physicians and medical laboratories report cases to 
a municipal health service (MHS) according to national 
notification criteria: presence of a predefined set of clini-
cal signs of hepatitis combined with HAV IgM in serum. 
MHS Consultants for Communicable Disease Control con-
tact the patient and administer a questionnaire that collects 
routine demographic and epidemiologic data consisting 
of age, sex, country of birth, time of disease onset, related 
cases, travel history, homosexual contacts, and other pos-
sible modes of transmission (full questionnaire available on 
request to M.P.). MHS enters the suspected transmission 
route and other anonymized information into a national 
electronic registration system hosted by the National Insti-
tute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM). All 
cases reported during July 1, 2008, through June 30, 2010, 
were included in the study.
Enhanced Surveillance
During the 2-year period, an enhanced surveillance 
system, which included systematic typing of viruses from 
patients, was deployed. All medical microbiological labo-
ratories and MHSs in the Netherlands were asked to send 
serum samples from all reported patients to the Laboratory 
for Infectious Diseases Research, Diagnostics and Screen-
ing at RIVM. RNA was extracted from the serum and test-
ed for HAV by reverse transcription PCR selective for the 
viral protein (VP) 1–2A region of the genome (3,4). HAV 
genotyping was conducted by sequencing of a 460-nt frag-
ment of the VP1–2A region. Sequence data were stored in 
a Bionumerics database (Sint-Martens-Latem, Belgium). 
Sequencing results were merged with the national registra-
tion data, according to laboratory name and serum sample 
number. For cases lacking a unique serum sample number, 
notification data and sequences were linked by using com-
binations of variables to match records (birth year, 4-digit 
postal code, date of illness onset, date of diagnosis).
The reporting MHSs were contacted twice by tele-
phone for interviews. We asked for the MHS conclusion 
as to the most probable modes of transmission immediately 
after the notification and then after results from sequenc-
ing were available. This approach was taken because public 
health measures for different transmission categories might 
differ (Table 1) and interventions could be adjusted accord-
ingly. The initial interviews were also used to inform MHS 
about the study and to emphasize the need for collection 
of serum samples. The conclusions as to possible mode of 
transmission before and after inclusion of typing informa-
tion were logged separately.
Because we used serum already available for diagnos-
tic purposes, ethics approval was not needed. Patients were 
approached according to existing guidelines, and analyses 
maintained patient anonymity.
Sequence Analyses and Strain Comparisons
The Bionumerics database already contained patient 
data and strain sequences from previous studies conduct-
ed in the Netherlands (3–6) and all available sequences 
from GenBank (19). These data were used for background 
comparison if sequences covered a minimum of 300 nt of 
the VP1–2a region and if information was available on the 
most probable country of infection (for travelers) or other 
risk activities (20,21). The geographic fingerprints and 
other risk-group associations (e.g., Dutch MSM strains) 
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Table 1. Hepatitis A virus transmission categories and supplementary public health actions, the Netherlands, 2008–2010 
Category Description Public health action* 
Travel-associated History of travel to a country with high, 
intermediate, or low HAV endemicity (18) 
Advise on future travel precautions 
Person-to-person Local contact with HAV-infected person Widen contact tracing to identify risk groups and vaccination 
(e.g., school, health care setting, homeless, travel group) 
MSM Male-with-male sex Widen contact tracing 
Foodborne Suspected food product or food handler Trace sources (notify the food safety authority) 
Unknown No other applicable category No further action 
*In addition to hygiene measures, vaccination of household contacts, and restriction from school or work according to national guidelines; HAV, hepatitis 
A virus; MSM, men who have sex with men. 
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from the background data were used to classify strain se-
quences from patients with unknown exposure to a prob-
able source. This association was reported to the MHS 
only if the association was considered robust; robust 
clusters consisted of at least 3 identical sequences from 
independent patients with the same country of infection 
or MSM association, branching separately in a maximum-
parsimony tree with >75% reproducibility of bootstraps. 
Clusters were defined when the following were found: at 
least 2 identical sequences branching separately in a max-
imum-parsimony tree with >75% reproducibility of boot-
straps. Maximum-parsimony trees (phylogenetic trees 
based on finding the simplest or minimal evolutionary 
change between strains) were built by using Bionumer-
ics, and reproducibility was tested by performing 1,000 
bootstraps. Cases with strains meeting this cluster defini-
tion and sharing the same suspected mode of transmission 
were considered confirmed clusters within the assigned 
transmission category.
Descriptive and Statistical Analyses
Data analyses were performed by using SAS software 
version 9.2/9.3 (SAS Institute, Cary, NC, USA). We de-
scribed the study population by age and sex, disease inci-
dence, and the number and percentage of patients for whom 
the virus could be typed. We analyzed the representativeness 
of age distribution for patients for whom sequencing was 
performed. If date of onset of disease was unknown, we used 
the date of diagnosis as a proxy. We compared age distribu-
tion and, when available, lag time between onset of disease 
and PCR diagnosis of positive and negative cases to weigh a 
negative result. We described the number and percentage of 
most probable modes of transmission in 5 categories (Table 
1) before and after inclusion of typing results.
Results
A total of 421 cases were reported. Of these, serum 
samples could be obtained from 292 (69%) patients; HAV 
RNA from 248 (59%) of these samples could be typed.
Description of Cases
The 421 cases reported over the 2-year period result-
ed in incidence rates of 1.2 cases/100,000 population dur-
ing the study year 2008–09 and 1.3 cases during 2009–10 
among a total population of 16.4 million at the start of 
the study period and 16.5 million at the start of the sec-
ond year. Most Most reported patients were in age groups 
from 0–9 through 40–49 years (range 13.3%–18.8% per 
group; Table 2). For patients in the youngest age group 
(0–9 years), sequenced cases were underrepresented, al-
though distributions for patients for whom sequencing 
was performed did not differ significantly from reported 
patients (data not shown). The overall proportion of male 
patients was 54.4%.
MHS determined the most probable modes of trans-
mission for 268 of the 421 reported cases before typing 
(64%). Travel-associated transmission dominated (141 
cases), followed by person-to-person transmission (76), 
male-to-male sexual contact (33), and foodborne transmis-
sion (18) (Table 3).
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Table 2. Description of reported patients with hepatitis A virus infection, by age group, the Netherlands, 2008–2010 
Age group, y Reported Male, no. (%) Incidence 2008–09* Incidence 2009–10* Sequenced, no. (%)† 
0–9 78 41 (52.6) 1.6 2.4 29 (37.2) 
10–19 74 37 (50.0) 2.5 1.3 48 (64.9) 
20–29 73 36 (49.3) 1.7 2.0 43 (58.9) 
30–39 56 35 (62.5) 1.3 1.2 42 (75.0) 
40–49 79 49 (62.0) 1.4 1.7 55 (69.6) 
50–59 36 18 (50.0) 0.6 1.0 23 (63.9) 
60–69 17 7 (41.2) 0.5 0.5 7 (41.2) 
70–79 5 3 (60.0) 0.3 0.2 1 (20.0) 
80–89 3 3 (100.0) 0.0 0.5 0 (0.0) 
Total 421 229 (54.4) 1.2 1.3 248 (59.0) 
*Cases/100.000 population, by age category.  
†Number and proportion of cases for which typing data could be obtained. 
 
Table 3. Hepatitis A transmission modes, the Netherlands, 2008–2010* 
Transmission No. reported  
Sequenced, no. (%) 
Total 
Assigned category 
confirmed Unresolved 
Assigned category misclassified 
and reassigned 
Travel-associated 141  66 (47) 40 (61) 23 (35) 3 (5) 
Person-to-person 76  53 (70) 53 (100) 0 0 
Male-with-male sex 33  25 (76) 23 (92) 2 (8) 0 
Foodborne 18  17 (94) 7 (41) 9 (53) 1 (6) 
Unknown 153  87 (57) NA 45 (52) 42 (48) 
Total 421  248 (59) 123 (50) 79 (32) 46 (19) 
*NA, not applicable; if a category was assigned after sequencing, then the assumption “unknown” was misclassified. 
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Sequence Analyses
Of 292 samples received (69% of reported cases) PCR 
results for HAV were negative for 39 and positive for 253 
(5 of which could not be typed and were excluded). The 
remaining 248 (59% of reported cases) were included in 
the final analysis. For 21 strains, sequencing was limited 
to 402–458 nt instead of the goal of 460 nt; for 1 strain, 
sequencing was limited to 100 nt.
Logistic regression showed that a longer lag time be-
tween onset of disease and diagnosis and belonging to the 
youngest or oldest age groups correlated with negative 
PCR results for HAV. This finding was expected because 
of unclear date of disease onset (data not shown).
Combined Analysis
Typing results confirmed all clusters of suspected 
person-to-person transmission, nearly all reported cases of 
male-to-male sexual transmission, and a large proportion of 
travel-associated infections (Table 3). One third of patients 
with travel-associated infections had traveled to countries 
with insufficient HAV sequence information in the public 
databases for reference. Therefore, the strain sequences for 
the virus in these patients could not be definitively assigned 
(category unresolved, Table 3).
In the category of suspected foodborne infections, 
nearly half of the cases for which sequencing had been per-
formed could be confirmed. Only 1 case was misclassified; 
this infection was assigned to male-to-male sexual contact 
because the strain from this patient matched the dominant 
strain for MSM and the patient’s sexual orientation was 
concordant with this finding. The remaining cases were 
considered unresolved because the virus sequences did not 
cluster with known sequence clusters in the database.
For almost half of the 87 patients with unknown mode 
of transmission for whom sequencing was performed, the 
mode of transmission was resolved according to interpre-
tation of the typing results. A remarkably high proportion 
(52%) of these infections were foodborne (Table 4).
Probable Foodborne Outbreaks
Cluster 1 began with 2 cases linked to the same restau-
rant according to notification alone. A cook working in the 
restaurant had been infected by the dominant strain usu-
ally identified in MSM. He had continued working during 
his illness and was the probable source of infection. After 
genotyping and additional questioning, 2 more cases were 
added to this cluster.
Cluster 2 consisted of 2 cases clustered in time. Each 
patient had a unique genotype IA strain not previously de-
tected, and both patients had eaten mussels.
Clusters 3 and 4 were associated with 2 consecutive 
outbreaks related to semidried tomatoes (12 and 5 primary 
cases, respectively). Cluster 3 turned out to be part of the 
largest foodborne outbreak thus far reported in the Nether-
lands, reaching 17 cases (including primary and secondary 
cases). The cases were clustered in time (reported in Febru-
ary and March) but were geographically dispersed, and the 
national notification rate was at an expected low level for 
this time of year, according to the 5 previous years. The 
strain sequences clustered with those from a large outbreak 
(at least 144 cases) in Australia and an outbreak (59 cases) 
in France, both of which were associated with consumption 
of semidried tomatoes (22–24). Cluster 4 was caused by a 
genotype IB strain closely resembling the strain involved 
in cluster 3.
Cluster 5 consisted of 1 case in a food handler of a 
dinner and 5 secondary cases. Cluster 6 consisted of 5 
cases that were clustered strongly in time and for which 
virus strain sequences were identical, but the cases were 
geographically dispersed. Although the strain sequences 
were similar to those of strains typically detected in trav-
elers returning from Morocco, the patients reported no 
travel history and no contact with patients with HAV in-
fection imported from Morocco. Moreover, they clustered 
in April, a time of year when secondary or tertiary infec-
tions following travel-related imported cases are rare (8). 
Therefore, this cluster was considered a point-source—
and very probably foodborne—cluster, although a source 
could not be determined.
Of 29 foodborne cases confirmed by a combination of 
epidemiologic and typing information (7 previously sus-
pected foodborne and 22 previously unknown source), 20 
additional reports were made. These cases were reported to 
the national food safety authority and international alerts 
through the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed and Ear-
ly Warning and Response System of the European Com-
mission and the European Centre for Disease Prevention 
and Control.
Unresolved Cases
For 45 (52%) cases initially reported as having no 
known source of infection (Table 3), conclusive evidence 
for a source was not found despite molecular typing. Never-
theless, some clustering occurred among these unresolved 
cases. The dominant MSM strain was found in 11 patients; 
however, these patients were not epidemiologically linked 
(time, place, food consumption), and among them were 
women and children, indicating spillover from the MSM 
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Table 4. Hepatitis A virus transmission categories after typing of 
42 cases previously assigned to transmission category 
“unknown,” the Netherlands, 2008–2010 
Transmission mode No. (%) 
Travel-associated 2 (5) 
Person-to-person 12 (29) 
Male-with-male sex 6 (14) 
Foodborne 22 (52) 
Total 42 (100) 
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risk group to the general population. Several other strains 
matched background strains previously imported from or 
known to circulate in Morocco and Egypt and even an out-
break strain from the Czech Republic (25). None of these 
patients had a history of travel. This finding could indicate 
unnoticed endemic transmission from persons with im-
ported cases, although transmission through food or food 
handlers could not be excluded.
Discussion
Use of real-time enhanced molecular surveillance of 
HAV infections for 2 years enabled us to identify food-
associated infections that had not been recognized through 
regular investigations by MHS. We confirmed almost half 
of the suspected foodborne cases and resolved a quarter of 
cases with initially unknown source of infection as prob-
able foodborne infections. Among these infections was an 
outbreak associated with semidried tomatoes, which was 
part of an international outbreak. This outbreak would not 
have been detected without genotyping because baseline 
surveillance did not generate a signal (22). Together, con-
firmed and unresolved foodborne infections explained 16% 
of 248 cases for which typing had been performed as op-
posed to the 4% that had been suspected on the basis of 
epidemiologic investigation alone. Furthermore, we were 
able to lower the proportion of cases with unknown mode 
of transmission from 35% to 18%. On the basis of these 
findings, we conclude that virus typing is useful for the de-
tection of foodborne outbreaks and, more generally, for the 
explanation of cases with unknown mode of transmission.
A strength of our study is the representativeness of 
the study population. In the Netherlands, HAV incidence 
remained steady at a very low endemic level of ≈200 re-
ported cases per year during 2005–2011 (26). Not only did 
we gather all notification data; we received 69% of patient 
serum samples. Age distribution was in accordance with 
the susceptibility of the population of the Netherlands (27) 
and with the distribution described in neighboring Germa-
ny (28). This study provides a realistic estimation of the 
incidence of foodborne infection in the Netherlands and 
maybe in industrialized countries with low HAV endemic-
ity in general, although varying between years with typical 
epidemic rather than endemic occurrence. The age distribu-
tion indicates a risk that food handlers will have an infec-
tion and become a source of foodborne infections. Of note, 
the proportion of foodborne infections was comparable to 
the proportion of infections among MSM; both types of in-
fection can be epidemic and sporadic.
Real-time investigation of cases enabled us to compare 
the conclusions that were drawn on interviews alone before 
typing with those drawn after receiving typing results. The 
hierarchy of assigning the most probable mode of transmis-
sion based on interviews was not standardized, supporting 
the need for more robust information. Previous studies con-
ducted in industrialized countries have provided insight into 
nationwide epidemiology supported by molecular typing 
data (11,28–32), although these studies have not been set 
up to direct the source tracing. Our study was able to detect 
foodborne clusters despite the long lag time between infec-
tion and notification (average 6 weeks). Routine implemen-
tation of standard food-consumption questionnaires at first 
patient contact and prompt forwarding of serum samples 
from HAV IgM–positive patients for typing can probably 
reduce the lag time.
Although we focused on foodborne infections, we have 
other findings to share. Nearly 100% of suspected cases of 
person-to-person and male-to-male sexual transmission of 
HAV could be confirmed; however, additional cases and 
previously undetected clusters surfaced after sequencing 
from the category “unknown.” Interventions were altered 
accordingly, which resulted in 8 additional screening or 
vaccination actions (data not shown). Only 61% of cases 
of travel-associated transmission could be confirmed. We 
have no reason to doubt the patients’ travel history. The 
most likely explanation is a lack of robust molecular infor-
mation from many countries. Secondary or additional cases 
acquired through contact with persons with unnoticed pri-
mary cases indeed proved to be part of the explanation for 
cases with unknown transmission, as expected, although 
we have shown that this was not the only explanation. In 
another study, we will aim to combine our data on travel-
related risk with data on travel behavior.
A proportion of cases left with unknown source of 
infection could still have been sporadic foodborne infec-
tions or part of undetected international clusters. We are 
only marginally able to detect such clusters, despite the ex-
istence of a shared database provided by GenBank and the 
early warning networks among public health services and 
food authorities (Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed 
and Early Warning and Response System). This marginal 
ability at least partly results from the fact that typing is of-
ten not a structural part of a national surveillance system, 
and if it is, there is no international consensus on the loca-
tion and length of the sequenced part of the HAV genome. 
GenBank offers many more strain sequences for compari-
son based on shorter sequences (<300 nt) or from different 
gene fragments, but the robustness of clustering decreases 
with fragment length (16). In addition, metadata in Gen-
Bank are often lacking, thereby limiting the usefulness of 
this repository for molecular epidemiologic studies.
A weakness of our study is that it was not designed to 
provide estimates for the number of cases prevented. For 
foodborne outbreaks, altering production processes with 
risk for contamination or withdrawal of (frozen) products 
from the market can substantially reduce the number of 
new cases. The described international outbreak did result 
600 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 20, No. 4, April 2014
Foodborne Hepatitis A, the Netherlands
in the evaluation of the manufacturing process of semidried 
tomatoes and a warning published by the food safety au-
thority to inform retailers about risky products. As further 
illustration of a possible cost benefit, 2 previously healthy 
persons who were part of a foodborne cluster each needed 
liver transplantation because of fulminant hepatitis; the 
costs associated with this treatment alone greatly exceed 
the costs of 2 years of typing all HAV cases.
A challenge associated with responding to foodborne 
illness outbreaks is that detection of pathogens in food 
products typically is requested as support for control activi-
ties by a food safety authority. The national food safety au-
thority was not able to confirm any of the suspected food-
borne clusters for several reasons but particularly because 
food leftovers were sparsely available (in part because of 
the long incubation period), and virus detection in food is 
challenging (13). Nevertheless, contamination of semidried 
tomatoes with HAV was actually confirmed in the related 
outbreak in Australia (23), and there are examples of HAV 
infection caused by consumption of food that was contami-
nated through contact with an infected food handler (33) or 
fecal contamination during food production (e.g., for shell-
fish or green onions) (34–36). The largest known outbreak, 
in Shanghai in 1988, resulted in >250,000 cases linked to 
the consumption of clams (37).
Molecular typing of HAV in patient serum is not routine-
ly performed, and strain typing information is not included 
in notifications. Combining typing results with anonymized 
notification data proved to be challenging in our surveillance 
system. We might have been unable to merge some cases 
with their typing results because of a lack of unique identifi-
ers, although we believe that this inability to merge cases and 
typing information occurred randomly and would not have 
substantially influenced the study results. According to our 
data, we advise revision of HAV surveillance so that it also 
provides baseline information to support foodborne illness 
detection. The revised system should also include mecha-
nisms for rapid exchange of this information internationally, 
to enhance the ability to detect diffuse outbreaks (38). With 
the fast development and decreasing cost of sequencing tech-
nology, routine collection of these types of data will become 
realistic in the near future and will provide added value for 
public health work provided such data-sharing mechanisms 
are developed (39). We have recently implemented this rec-
ommendation in our national guidelines.
We also recommend that strains uploaded to GenBank 
be accompanied, at least, by information about time (date 
of diagnosis or disease onset rather than by date of sub-
mission) and space (country where infection most likely 
was acquired rather than country from which infection was 
reported). Sufficient molecular background information is 
needed to be able to notice a distinct cluster. Therefore, 
broad sampling, data sharing, and centralized interpretation 
of data should be part of an enhanced surveillance system. 
The previously described foodborne outbreaks have al-
ready proved the usefulness of national and international 
exchange of epidemiologic and sequence data.
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